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Abstract 
We empirically study whether citizens´ trust in public administration is influenced by the outcomes 
delivered by public services or by due process (administrative impartiality or absence of corruption) 
from a regional perspective. The paper fits a multilevel model on a unique dataset with a total of 
129,773 observations nested in 173 European regions, using data from a series of pooled 
Eurobarometer surveys and from the European Quality of Government Index. We find that both public 
service outcomes and processes have a significant impact on citizens´ trust in public administration, 
but that process, and in particular absence of corruption is the strongest institutional determinant. 
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Introduction 
Citizens´ trust in their public administration is an important indicator for evaluating public services 
and government bureaucracies. Whether or not such subjective assessments reflect the quality and 
performance of public administrations, they drive behaviours of citizens towards the administration  
(Marien & Hooghe, 2011; Van de Walle, 2017). While assertions of continually declining trust appear 
not to be entirely supported by the data (Van de Walle, Van Roosbroek, & Bouckaert, 2008; Van 
Ryzin, 2011), trust in public administration is low in many countries (Charron & Rothstein, 2018; 
Houston & Harding, 2013). Indeed, in a recent Eurobarometer survey, it was found that the number 
of European citizens stating that they tend to trust their public administration is only slightly higher 
than the number stating they do not trust it (European Commission, 2017d).  
Research shows that there are important country-level differences in peoples’ attitudes to public 
administration and the civil service (Newton & Norris, 2000; Van de Walle, 2007), but it remains 
unclear to what extent institutional quality explains such differences. Furthermore, despite the fact 
that many public services are organized and provided below the national level, existing studies have 
mostly ignored this regional level perspective. Regional variation on service quality and performance 
can be high. In this paper we study the role of institutional quality in terms of process and outcomes 
for citizens trust in their public administration from a regional perspective. We develop a hierarchical 
model using a unique pooled dataset of citizens´ trust in public administration at the individual level, 
and the three main predictors (quality, impartiality, and absence of corruption) at the regional level 
(Charron, Dijkstra, & Lapuente, 2014, 2015; Charron, Lapuente, & Annoni, 2019). We use data from 
173 subnational regions in Europe.   
We build and extent current research on the relation between institutional quality and citizen trust 
in public administration and services in two ways. First, earlier work on trust in public administration 
and its determinants has focused on single countries (see e.g., del Pino, Calzada, and Díaz-Pulido 
2016; Rego, Sarrico, and Moreira 2006; Rölle 2009; Vigoda-Gadot and Yuval 2004; Yackee and 
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Lowery 2005) but increasingly, scholars have started doing cross-national studies as well (Choi, 2018; 
Houston, Aitalieva, Morelock, & Shults, 2016; Van Ryzin, 2011). Yet, most studies lack a sufficient 
number of level-2 units (countries or geographic units) thereby severely limiting the number of 
country-level predictors on institutional quality that can statistically be included in the analysis, and 
reducing the robustness of the findings. The data from the International Social Survey Programme 
(ISSP), which has been used in most attempts to measure and explain variation in trust in the civil 
service (see recently e.g., Choi 2018; Houston et al. 2016; Van Ryzin 2011), only has data for 33 
countries, spread across the globe.  
Second, some institutional quality-related explanations for variation in citizens’ trust in public 
administration have suffered from common method bias by using indicators of attitudes on 
institutional quality and subjective trust measured in the same survey. Some earlier studies (see 
above) have solved this problem by relying on the World Bank Governance Indicators (WGI), but 
continue to suffer from a relatively low n at the country level. In this paper we attempt to solve this 
problem by combining data from two different large-n datasets for level 1 (individual) and level 2 
(regional) observations in a dataset with 129,773 observation nested in 173 European regions. 
 
Supply-side theories for explaining trust in public administration: Do outcomes and processes 
matter? 
Government does not only have to “deliver the goods” (Córdova & Layton, 2016, p. 77), it also needs 
to respect procedure. Good governance has an impact on political trust (Spiteri & Briguglio, 2018) as 
well as on trust in public administration (Houston et al., 2016; Van Ryzin, 2011). Our paper follows 
what Norris (2011) has called ‘supply-side theories’ that seek to explain citizens´ satisfaction with the 
political system by looking at the structure, process and performance of institutions. One of the 
crucial debates in scholarship on trust in institutions has been whether citizens look mainly at 
outcomes or at process when forming opinions (Tyler 2006(1990)). This distinction is quite 
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commonly used in research (Córdova & Layton, 2016), and earlier work on trust in civil servants has 
called for more attention to process to explain such trust (Van Ryzin, 2011). 
A lot of the older work on trust in institutions paid attention to outcomes of the (political) system as 
drivers of changes in trust. This includes outcomes such as macro-economic developments or 
government performance. Citizens also have normative expectations regarding fairness, impartiality 
and the absence of corruption when evaluating public institutions. Recently we have seen more 
attention for process and procedures, largely inspired by the work of Tom Tyler on procedural justice 
(Tyler, 2006b). Scholars have used this approach to focus on various institutions, such as trust in the 
police and the courts (Young and Hassan, 2018), political trust (van der Meer & Hakhverdian, 2017), 
or trust in local government (Gustavsen, Røiseland, & Pierre, 2014). A recurring finding is that both 
outcome and process are sources of trust, but that process matters more.  
Public administration scholarship has also looked at the role of process and outcome evaluations for 
trust in public services or in civil servants. One of the earliest major studies on trust in civil servants 
was Anderson and Tverdova's (2003) paper, in which the authors looked at the effects of corruption 
on trust in civil servants in 16 countries, using ISSP data. Most other international studies have relied 
on the 2006 ISSP data. Van Ryzin, in a study using data from 33 countries, found that not only 
outcomes and service quality drive citizens´ trust in civil servants, but also, and perhaps even more, 
administrative process (Van Ryzin, 2011, 2015, p. 438). Houston et al. (2016) performed a 21-country 
analysis of trust in civil servants looking at, amongst other, government performance and corruption 
perceptions, taken from the World Bank Governance Indicators and Transparency International. 
They found that “institutional quality accounts for variation in the level of trust across countries.” (p. 
1210). More recently, Choi (2018) looked at citizen trust in the civil service in 18 OECD countries, 
using bureaucratic characteristics to explain variation. Just like our study, it also relies on the QOG 
data, whereas the dependent variable is taken from the ISSP. Choi finds higher trust when 
bureaucracy is more impartial and more representative.  
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Our paper is an expansion of Van Ryzin´s (2011) study in the Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory and Houston et al.´s  (2016) article. In our paper, we simultaneously look at the 
effect of outcomes (institutional quality) and process (impartiality and absence of corruption) on 
citizen trust in public administration. However, our paper uses regional-level data rather than 
nation-level data.  
According to proponents of the performance movement, citizens’ trust in public administration is 
dependent on government outcomes and results (Kettl, 2006; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). The 
assumption is that citizens evaluate government on what it delivers and a perceived lack of trust has 
been the explicit rationale for widespread output-oriented government reforms (Van de Walle, 
2018; Van Ryzin, 2011, 2015). These arguments are not without merit. A number of studies have 
found strong and positive associations between trust and government performance (Van Ryzin, 
2015; Eran Vigoda-Gadot, 2006). Based on these studies, we hypothesize that citizens’ trust in public 
administration is positively related to public service outcomes:  
H1 (outcomes): Public service outcomes are positively related to citizen trust in public 
administration  
However, in forming attitudes about the public sector, citizens might care as much about how 
outcomes are produced as about what those outcomes actually are (Tyler, 2006b, 2006a). According 
to Van Ryzin (2011) process characteristics have a bigger impact on citizens’ trust in public 
administration than outcomes do. He argues that citizens might have  a clearer understanding of 
how services should be provided than about what those services should be (Van Ryzin, 2011). 
Building on this research, Choi (2018) finds that impartiality is one of the most important drivers of 
citizens’ perceptions of public administration in the OECD. At the same time, a number of studies 
have found clear evidence that citizens’ trust in public services and public administration is 
negatively related to the level of corruption (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Dahlström, Lapuente, & 
Teorell, 2012; Houston & Harding, 2013; Van Ryzin, 2015). Citizens expect public officials to act 
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ethically and restrain from corrupt practices (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Van Ryzin, 2015). Building 
on these studies, we hypothesize that citizens’ trust in public administration is positively related to 
the impartiality of and absence of corruption in public services:  
H2 (process): Impartiality of public services is positively related to citizen trust in public 
administration 
H3 (process): Absence of corruption in public services is positively related to citizen trust in 
public administration 
 
 Why looking at regional disparities is important 
Attention for regional variation in institutional performance started with Putnam et al.´s (1993) classic 
“Making democracy work”, in which he explored regional institutional performance in Italy (Putnam 
et al., 1993). Differences can be due to different factors, such as centre-periphery inequalities, both 
macro-economically and in terms of the regional allocation and availability of public services, or 
historical factors having an effect on the (political) integration of regions into the wider country. 
Within Europe, and beyond, there exist important regional disparities in how citizens view 
government and public services. Examples are the North and South of Italy, the former East and West 
of Germany, as well as Belgium and Spain (Charron & Rothstein, 2018). Government, and its 
administration, is in some of the regions highly distrusted and met with suspicion, whereas in others 
this is less the case,  despite regions sharing the same formal national institutions (Charron & 
Lapuente, 2013). 
The focus in existing scholarship on explaining national-level variation in trust in public administration 
has some drawbacks. The samples used are often very heterogeneous and tend to contain countries 
located on different continents. Analyses on continental subgroups, which have been mainly 
performed for European and Asian countries, suffer from small numbers of countries, thereby 
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reducing the number of variables that can be included at level 2 in multilevel models. Yet, most 
analyses about the citizen perspective on public administration have focused on the national level, 
because more extensive data did not (yet) exist (Choi, 2018; Houston et al., 2016; Rölle, 2009; Van 
Ryzin, 2011).  
However, some studies have found significant intra-country regional differences. Lee and Van Ryzin 
(2018), for instance found regional differences in their study of bureaucratic reputation of US 
Federal Agencies. They explained this variance by referring to the different impact policies have on  
regions and communities (Lee & Van Ryzin, 2018, p. 5). Likewise, del Pino, Calzada, and Díaz-Pulido 
(2016) observed considerable within-country regional variation in attitudes towards public 
administration in Spain and in evaluations of its performance. They however failed to find an 
explanation for this substantial 17-region variation. Charron and Rothstein (2018), in what can be 
considered the first large scale study of trust at the regional level, found that regional variation in 
generalised trust is for 78% explained by country-level variation and 22% by regional-level variation 
(Charron & Rothstein, 2018). They found that quality of government is by far the best predictor for 
such variation in trust. Berman (1997) also found jurisdictional variance in citizen cynicism, 
something he attributes to local economic conditions. 
In an attempt to explain this regional variation, the current paper will analyse levels of trust in public 
administration measured at the individual level among individuals nested in 173 regions in 28 EU 
countries, using regional level data for both the dependent variable and the predictors. 
 
Data and Method 
We examine predictors of citizens’ trust in public administration using outcome- and process-related 
predictors at the regional level, controlling for individual-level factors, using a multilevel binomial 
logit analysis. The dependent variable and the individual-level control variables have been taken 
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from five subsequent Eurobarometer surveys that have been pooled. The independent variables at 
the regional level have been taken from the European Quality of Government Index (EQI) survey. 
Figure 1 show the provenance of the main variables. 
 
Figure 1: Structure of the analysis 
 
 
Dependent variable 
The Standard Eurobarometer contains a number of questions on respondents’ trust in institutions. 
One of these questions asks respondents whether they tend to trust their public administration: “I 
would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of 
the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: Public 
administration in (OUR COUNTRY) “. We excluded the 6.7% “don’t know” responses from the 
analysis. In regional aggregates, we refer to the percentage of citizens that indicated to trust the 
public administration their country (see figure 2).  
The Standard Eurobarometer is a bi-annual public opinion survey that collects data on the attitudes 
and opinions of EU-residents of 15-years and older. For each wave, approximately 1,000 individuals 
EQI (regional level) 
PA outcomes 
Impartiality of PA 
Eurobarometer (individual level)  
Absence of corruption 
Eurobarometer (individual level) 
Trust in public 
administration 
Control variables 
9 
 
per country are interviewed (except for Cyprus, Malta, and Luxembourg, where the sample is half 
that size). A three-stage random probability procedure is used to produce nationally representative 
samples (Bethlehem & Holsteyn, 2017; Leibnitz-Intstute für Sozialwissenschaften, n.d.; Nissen, 
2014). We pooled data from five Standard Eurobarometer surveys, conducted between spring 2016 
and spring 2018 (EB 85.2, EB 86.2, EB 87.3, EB 88.3, and EB 89.1; European Commission, 2017a, 
2017b, 2017c, 2018a, 2018b) in order to obtain a sample which is sufficiently large to be 
representative at the regional level. .  
Regional affiliation is indicated using the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) 
classification. Where possible, NUTS regions follow member states’ existing administrative units 
(e.g., German Bundesländer or Belgian Regions). We used the NUTS 2 levels to identify regions in the 
Eurobarometer data, except when only information on the respondents´ NUTS 1 level was available. 
We excluded exclaves and European oversees areas from the analysis. In a final step, regional 
nomenclature was harmonized according to the NUTS 2016 classification (European Commission, 
2016). Newly created regions were assigned scores according to their former constituent parts (See 
appendix 1). Despite the pooling of the data, five regions still had fewer than 50 respondents in our 
data set, and were removed to increase reliability.1 This resulted in a multilevel sample of n = 173 
regions and a total of n = 129,773 respondents. 
 
Independent variables  
To measure outcomes and process of public services at the regional level, we use data from the 2017 
regional edition of the European Quality of Government Index (EQI) survey by the Quality of 
Government Institute (QOG) at the University of Gothenburg (Charron, 2013; Charron et al., 2015; 
Charron & Lapuente, 2018). This index is based on a survey among 78,000 respondents from 192 
European NUTS 1 and NUTS 2 regions, with samples of 400-450 individuals per NUTS region (Charron 
et al., 2015). The regional EQI was developed especially to measure “average citizens’ perceptions and 
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experiences with corruption, and the extent to which they rate their public services as impartial and 
of good quality in their region of residence” (Charron & Lapuente, 2018, p. 6).  
Public administration outcomes were measured by asking respondents to assess the quality of the 
delivery of public services like education, health care, and law enforcement in their region, ranging 
from ‘extremely poor quality’ (1) to ‘extremely high quality’ (10) (see also appendix 2).  
Public administration impartiality was measured using three survey items: whether certain citizens 
received preferential treatment in the delivery of services, whether the tax authorities treat all 
people equally, and whether all citizens were treated equally in the provision of services. 
Absence of corruption was measured by asking whether corruption was needed to get (a) basic 
public services and (b) special and unfair privileges, as well as whether regional elections were free 
of corruption. Furthermore, respondents were asked whether they had ever been asked to pay a 
bribe, and whether they ever paid a bribe (Charron, 2013; Charron & Lapuente, 2018). 
The three sets of items were aggregated into three composite indicators (‘impartiality’, ‘absence of 
corruption’, and ‘outcome quality’). According to the Quality of Government institute (Charron, 
2013; Charron & Lapuente, 2018), the item-scores were first recoded so that higher scores indicate 
higher quality of government. Second, the attribution of items to the ‘pillars’ was assessed using 
principal components analysis. Before aggregation, the items scores were normalized using 
standardization. Finally, using equal weighting, the items were aggregated into the composite 
indicators (Charron & Lapuente, 2018; Charron et al., 2019; Rothstein, 2013).3 Furthermore, we 
grand-mean centred these indicators to improve interpretability for multilevel analysis use (Hox, 
Moerbeek, & Van de Schoot, 2018). 
 
Table 1. Descriptives level-2 variables 
Variables Mean Std. Deviation Min Max 
Quality .0349 .934 -2.586 2.229 
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Impartiality .0784 1.013 -1.715 2.651 
Absence of Corruption .0074 1.057 -2.695 2.045 
 
 
Control variables 
A number of control variables are added to account for variation in levels of trust in public 
administration due to factors that have been identified in earlier research. We control for ideology. 
Earlier work on trust in public administration found an effect of political affiliation on confidence in 
public administrators (del Pino et al., 2016; Houston & Harding, 2013).  Citizens’ political left-right 
self-identification is likely to provide them with a schema (Sears, 2001; Zaller, 1992) to come to 
opinions about the public sector, and the outcome and process of public administration. The 
mechanism through which political ideology works is not clear though. It could be that those on the 
right prefer small government and therefore distrust government (Kumlin, 2001). An alternative 
argument is that those on the left are more sceptical of government, and institutions in general 
(Listhaug & Wiberg, 1995, p. 315). Finally, a relation between ideology and trust could also be 
explained by the congruence hypothesis, according to which a government that is in line with one’s 
views is trusted more, and likewise the association between ideology and trust changes after a 
change in power. 
Political ideology was measured as respondents’ self-placement on a ten-point scale ranging from 
left (1) to right (10). We recoded the original responses into three groups: left: (1-4), centre (5-6), 
and right (7-10). Other response categories were dropped.  
Individuals’ political interest was operationalized as the frequency with which they discussed 
national, European, and local matters on a yearly basis. Respondents were asked: When you get 
together with friends or relatives, would you say you discuss frequently, occasionally or never about: 
national political matters / European political matters / Local political matters? Answers ranged from 
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(1) ‘Frequently’, and (2) ‘Occasionally’, to (3) ‘Never’. A political interest index was constructed by 
summating the three dimensions into a single compound variable with four answer categories (1) 
‘Strong’, (2) ‘Medium’, (3) ‘Low’, and (4) ‘Not at all’. 
Economic strain is a measure of the difficulty with which people make ends meet on their current 
income and is generally inversely related to social and political trust (Reeskens & Vandecasteele, 
2017). It is assumed that such strain increases respondents´ dependence on public services, and we 
know this variable also has an impact on political trust (Andrews, Jilke, & Van de Walle, 2014; 
Reeskens & Vandecasteele, 2017). Respondents were asked: During the last twelve months, would 
you say you had difficulties to pay your bills at the end of the month? Answers ranged from: ‘most of 
the time’ (1) and ‘from time to time’ (2), to ‘almost never\never’ (3). The answer categories were 
recoded into a positive relation, while the ‘don’t knows’ and refusals were dropped from the 
analysis.  
We also control for respondents’ gender, age, and educational status. Lee and Van Ryzin (2018), in 
their study of bureaucratic reputation, found that female respondents have a more positive view of 
the reputation of agencies. Gender was coded dichotomously (men = 0, women = 1). A higher 
education is associated with more awareness of how public administration works, and the quality it 
delivers, but also better insights into quality problems of public services (Van de Walle, 2007). To 
control for education, we add educational status based on the age when respondents ended their 
full-time education. Categories range from ‘no full-time education to stopped before the 16th 
birthday’ (1) and ‘stopped between the 16th and 20th birthday’ (2), to ‘stopped full-time education 
after the 20th birthday’ (3). Respondents who indicated to still be studying were assigned to the 
categories 1, 2, or 3 depending on their age. ‘Refusals’ and ‘don’t knows’ were recoded as missing. 
Age is recoded into four age categories (15 to 24, 25 to 39, 40 to 54, and 55 years and older). 
Finally, we control for community type. Access to public services is different for rural areas than for 
larger towns, and regional disparities and economic inequalities may drive trust. These serve as 
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heuristics for judging government fairness or procedural justice in the area (Cordova & Layton, 
2016). Community type was measured on a four-item categorical scale: “would you say you live in a: 
rural area or village (1); small or middle sized town (2); Large town (3); Don’t Know (4)?”. The ‘don’t 
know’ category was dropped from the analysis.  
 
Analysis 
The analysis includes 129,773 responses from 173 regions, gathered between the spring of 2016 and 
the spring of 2018. Figure 2 shows the percentage of respondents per region that indicated to trust 
their public administration. Regions with a dark blue (green) colour are the regions with the highest 
trust, regions with a dark red (yellow) colour are the regions with the lowest trust. The regions in 
which the largest proportion of respondents indicated to trust public administration were 
Burgenland (AT, 91.5%), Salzburg (AT, 86%), Luxembourg (LU, 85.5%), and Carinthia (AT, 82.3%). The 
regions in which the smallest proportion of respondents indicated to trust their public 
administration were Sardinia (IT, 1.2%) and Peloponnesus (EL, 8.2%). Overall, the regions with the 
highest levels of trust are located in North and North-West Europe, while the regions with the 
lowest levels of trust are located in the South, South-East, and East of Europe.  
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The regional variation in trust in public administration within countries can be large. Figure 3 
presents the proportions of country variance explained by regional differences per country (in 
percentages). Regional differences are most pronounced in Italy,  Austria and Spain. The countries in 
which the regional-level contributes least to the variance in trust are Croatia, Finland, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden. Countries without between-region variance were measured as a single 
region, for which no regional disaggregation is possible. These are all relatively small countries. 
Figure 2. Respondents’ trust in their national public administration per region 
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A multilevel binomial logit model 
We estimate a multilevel fixed effects binomial logit model using the generalized mixed-effects 
(glmer) function of the lme4 package in the software program R (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 
2015). Results are displayed in odds ratios, indicating the change in the odds of respondents trusting 
their public administration compared to not trusting their public administration. 
First, we estimated the need for a multilevel approach by estimating the proportion of variability in 
the logits of respondents trusting their public that could be explained by regional differences. We 
used an intercept-only or unconditional mean model (model 0) to estimate the intraclass correlation 
coefficient (ICC) (Hox et al., 2018; Luke, 2004; Sommet & Morselli, 2017). With an ICC of .155 we 
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conclude that 15.5% of the variation in the logits of respondents’ trust in public administration can 
be explained by regional differences (e.g., level-2 variability).2  
 
Findings 
In the second step, we estimated the effects of the level-1 predictors, which are the control variables 
in our model (model 1). The results show that two individual level predictors significantly affect 
respondents´ trust in public administration: economic strain and political interest. First, respondents 
who experience economic strain have lower trust in public administration than respondents who do 
not experience economic strain. This effect becomes stronger as the experience of economic strain 
increases. Whereas the odds of respondents trusting their public administration are 29.3% lower for 
respondents who experience economic strain from time to time compared to never, these odds 
increase to 46.5% for respondents who experience economic strain most of the time compared to 
never. Second, respondents with low and medium political interest have higher odds of trusting 
their public administration than respondents with no political interest. The odds of respondents with 
low political interest to trust their public administration were 10.6% higher than respondents with 
no political interest, respondents with medium political interest were 17.9% more likely to trust 
public administration than respondents with no political interest. Interestingly, respondents with 
high political interest do not appear to be more trusting of their public administration than 
respondents with no political interest are. Political ideology does not have a significant direct effect 
on respondents´ trust in public administration in our analysis.  
We also find that gender, age, and education significantly affect respondents’ odds of trusting their 
public administration. First, women are modestly more trusting of their public administrations than 
men are. Second, the odds of trusting the national public administration are lower for respondents 
in the age categories 25-39, 40-54, and 55+ than for respondents in the age category 15-25. In line 
with earlier findings, this effect is most pronounced for respondents in the age category 40-54 years 
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compared to respondents in the age category 15-25 years. Third, the number of years of formal 
education significantly affects respondents’ trust public administration as well. For higher educated 
respondents the odds of trusting their public administration were 17.4% higher than those of 
respondents who had no formal education or who quit before their 15th birthday. Finally, the type 
of community does not significantly affect the odds of individuals trusting public administration 
according to our analysis.   
 
Do public administration process and outcomes matter?  
In the third step, we estimated the model with both individual-level variables (controls) and 
regional-level predictors (model 2). The regional-level predictors (public administration outcome and 
process). The three predictors are added one by one, and then together. First, the effects of the 
individual-level predictors are roughly stable across all models. All three regional-level predictors 
(absence of corruption, impartiality and outcomes) have a significant and strong individual effect on 
the odds of trust in public administration. The direct effect is strongest for the absence of 
corruption. When all three predictors are entered simultaneously, impartiality of public services 
loses statistical significance in its effect on trust because this indicator captures a similar latent 
construct as the absence of corruption (also: endnote 3).  
The absence of corruption and the perceived outcome quality of public services significantly 
influence respondents´ trust in public administration. Of these, the perceived absence of corruption 
has the strongest effect. For each standard deviation increase in the absence of corruption, the odds 
of trusting public administration rise by 39.1%. This corroborates Houston et al.´s 2016 findings 
where a similar strong effect of corruption on trust in civil servants was found in a 21-country study. 
This effect is almost double the size of the effect of the perceived outcome quality of public services. 
For each standard deviation increase in the perceived outcome quality of public services, the odds of 
trusting public administration increase by 22.3%. Controlled for the absence of corruption, the 
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perceived impartiality of public services does not have a statistically significant effect on 
respondents´ trust in public administration in our analysis. This shows that both outcome and 
process of public administration have an impact on individuals´ trust in public administration, but 
that the effect is stronger for process. We conclude that hypotheses 1 and 3 are confirmed. 
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 Table 2. Trust in public administration: Fixed-effects parameter estimates in odds ratios (standard errors between brackets)  
 
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept 1.055 (.062) 1.243 (.072)*** 1.253 (.073)*** 1.264 (.074)*** 1.226 (.071)** 1.230 (.072)**   
 
 
       
 
 
Political interest - 
Not 
 
 -  -  -  -  -  
Political interest - 
low 
 
 1.106 (.064)*** 1.107 (.064)*** 1.105 (.064)*** 1.106 (.064)*** 1.107 (.064)*** 
Political interest - 
Medium 
 
 1.177 (.069)*** 1.179 (.069)*** 1.177 (.069)*** 1.178 (.069)*** 1.179 (.069)*** 
Political interest - 
Strong 
 
 1.035 (.06) 1.036 (.06) 1.034 (.06) 1.034 (.06) 1.034 (.06) 
Ideology - Left 
 
 -  -  -  -  -  
Ideology - Centre 
 
 .991 (.058) .992 (.058) .991 (.058) .992 (.058) .992 (.058) 
Ideology - Right 
 
 1.000 (.058) 1.001 (.058) 1.000 (.058) 1.002 (.058) 1.002 (.058) 
Economic strain -
Never 
 
 -  -  -  -  -  
Economic strain - 
From time to time 
 
 .705 (.041)*** .706 (.041)*** .706 (.041)*** .707 (.041)*** .707 (.041)*** 
Economic strain - 
Most of the time 
 
 .463 (.027)*** .464 (.027)*** .464 (.027)*** .465 (.027)*** .465 (.027)*** 
             
Outcome quality     1.457 (.085)***     1.222 (.071)*** 
Impartiality 
 
 
 
   1.359 (.079)***   .957 (.056) 
Absence of 
Corruption 
 
 
 
     1.505 (.088)*** 1.391 (.081)*** 
             
Gender - Men 
 
 -  -  -  -  -  
Gender - Women  
 
 1.046 (.061)*** 1.047 (.061)*** 1.047 (.061)*** 1.047 (.061)*** 1.047 (.061)*** 
Education < 16 
 
 -  -  -  -  -  
Education 16-19 
 
 1.008 (.059) 1.010 (.059) 1.008 (.059) 1.010 (.059) 1.011 (.059) 
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Education > 20 
 
 1.172 (.068)*** 1.174 (.068)*** 1.171 (.068)*** 1.173 (.068)*** 1.174 (.068)*** 
Age < 25 
 
 -  -  -  -  -  
Age 25-39 
 
 .844 (.049)*** .844 (.049)*** .844 (.049)*** .844 (.049)*** .845 (.049)*** 
Age 40-54 
 
 .813 (.047)*** .813 (.047)*** .813 (.047)*** .813 (.047)*** .813 (.047)*** 
Age > 55 
 
 .864 (.05)*** .865 (.05)*** .864 (.05)*** .864 (.05)*** .865 (.05)*** 
Community type - 
Rural 
 
 -  -  -  -  -  
Community type - 
Small/Middle town 
 
 1.026 (.059) 1.026 (.059) 1.026 (.06) 1.026 (.06) 1.026 (.06) 
Community type - 
Large town 
 
 1.009 (.059) 1.011 (.059) 1.009 (.059) 1.010 (.059) 1.011 (.059) 
 
ICC .155 .127 .095 .104 .083 .077 
Deviance 164,391.9 131,390.4 131,338.4 131,356.8 131,315.4 131,302.6 
df.resid 129,771 104,604 104,603 104,603 104,603 104,601 
AIC 164,395.9 131,424.4 131,374.4 131,392.8 131,351.4 131,342.6 
BIC 164,415.5 131,568.9 131,546.4 131,564.9 131,523.5 131,533.8 
 
N level-1 129,773 104,621 104,621 104.621 104,621 104,621 
N level-2 173 173 173 173 173 173 
*** P < .001; ** P = .01, * P = .05 
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In total, the variables included in this model explain about half the variation of region-based trust in 
public administration (i.e. 8.29%). The remaining 8.91% of region-level based variation remains 
unexplained or random. 
Because model 5 is nested in models 2, 3, and 4, we use ꭓ2 test to see whether model 5 provides a 
significant reduction in deviance compared to its three preceding models. The reduction in 
deviances by model 5 compared to models 2, 3, and 4 is 35.8, 54.2, and 12.8 respectively. These 
reductions are larger than the critical value under the ꭓ2 distribution at two degrees of freedom (Δ 
df. compared to model 5) at a significance level of p.005 (e.g., 10.828). Model 5 is therefore a 
significant improvement to models 2, 3, and 4 (see appendix 3). These findings are corroborated by 
the AIC and BIC indices. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
Using opinion data on trust in public administration among nearly 130,000 respondents nested in 
173 regions, we find that public service outcomes (H1) and absence of corruption (H3) positively 
influence citizen trust in public administration. While the impartiality of public services is statistically 
significant and positively related to citizens’ trust in public administration on its own, it loses 
statistical significance when controlled for the absence of corruption and the quality of public 
services. This is not to say that the impartiality of public services is an unimportant determinant of 
citizens’ trust in its own right – we showed that it is – but that the effects of absence of corruption 
and the impartiality of public services on citizens’ trust in public administration are closely related.3 
In fact, both variable serve as process indicators in our study. Future research could explore the 
relationship between impartiality and absence of corruption.  
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Both process and outcome of public services have a significant effect on citizen trust. These findings 
confirm earlier studies about the effect of process and outcomes on levels of institutional trust. This 
paper has also revealed that it is essential to look at the subnational level when analysing citizens´ 
attitudes to public services, because in some countries within-country regional variation can be 
substantial.  
While not the purpose of the paper, a preliminary screening of the data also shows that outcome 
and process appear to have a different effect on trust in public administration among different 
groups. Respondents´ political leanings are relevant to whether outcomes or process are more 
important for trust in public administration. For left-leaning respondents, process (absence of 
corruption) is more important, whereas for right-leaning ones, outcomes of public administration 
are more important as determinants of trust in public administration. Trust in public administration 
among citizens who experience economic strain is influenced more by the outcome than by process. 
Presumably this is because they are personally directly affected by poor quality public services on 
which they are heavily dependent in their strained situation. These factors deserve further 
exploration. 
In this analysis we looked at region-based explanations. Future research could combine regional and 
country effects and examine the proportions of variance attributable to differences in regions and 
differences in counties. Though data requirements pose a barrier, such a model could provide 
valuable insight in the interaction between region and country based differences, as well as the 
varying effects of regional differences in different countries.  
In addition to its large sample, this paper innovates through disaggregating to the regional level, and 
through using different datasets for the dependent and independent variables. The focus on 173 
regions means that the total number of level-2 units is sufficiently large to be able to run a robust 
analysis. It hereby improves on earlier analyses which have focused on the national level only.  
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The paper has a number of limitations. The dependent variable is dichotomous (tend to trust/tend 
not to trust) which means answers are not very nuanced. Also, we have no means of checking 
whether trust attitudes have a foundation in respondents´ direct personal experience with public 
service, even though our control variables have captured at least part of this aspect. The number of 
observations per region are sometimes relatively small (though regions with fewer than 50 
respondents were excluded from the analysis), which may have an effect on the reliability of the 
results. Finally, data on the process and outcome of public administration are based on a survey and 
therefore subjective. Fully objective data allowing to compare the quality of public administration at 
the regional level (or even at the national level) do not exist. 
In this study we examined the effects of the outcome and process quality of regional public 
services on citizen trust in their regional public administration. Such subjective measures are 
important indicators for analysing and evaluating public services and government bureaucracies 
from a citizen perspective. Governments aiming at increasing citizens’ trust in regional public 
administrations are well advised to focus on both the process and outcome quality of public services. 
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Endnotes: 
1 Due to the small number of observations per region, we excluded the regions Cantabria (n = 28), 
Limousin (n = 31), Liguria (n = 14), Friuli-Venezia Guilia (n = 38), and Umbria (n = 37) from our 
analysis. We tested whether our results were robust to the exclusion of these five regions and 
concluded that their exclusion did not change our results. 
2 Conducting a similar analysis on the proportion of variance in respondents’ trust in their public 
administration attributable to between-country differences, we observe that 13.6% of the variance 
can be explained by country differences. This proportion is 1.9 percentage points lower than the 
proportion of variance attributable to between-region differences. 
3 The Pearson correlations between quality and impartiality, absence of corruption and quality, and 
absence of corruption and impartiality are .528 (p < .001), .562 (p < .001), and .761 (p < .001) 
respectively. As expected, the correlation between impartiality and absence of corruption is 
substantial.  
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Appendix 1 
NUTS 1 aggregates were used for: Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and 
the United Kingdom. NUTS 2 aggregates were used for: Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Spain, France, 
Finland, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Finally, for a group of countries no 
NUTS level aggregates are compiled. For these countries, the country aggregates are used as group 
aggregates. These countries are: Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, and Slovenia.  
Second, a number of regions were excluded from the analysis, either because we choose not to 
include the overseas areas and exclaves in the analysis, or because there is no data on them. We 
chose not to include Ceuta (ES), Melilla (ES), Balearic Islands (ES), Guadeloupe (FR), Martinique (FR), 
Guyana (FR), La Reunion (FR), Mayotte (FR), Azores (PT), and Madeira (PT) in the analysis. 
Furthermore, some regions remained unsampled in the Eurobarometer. These regions were: La Rioja 
(ES), Åland (FI), Corsica (FR), North Aegean (EL), South Aegean (EL), Ionian Islands (EL), Provincia 
Autonoma di Bolzano/Bozen (IT), and Provincia Autonoma di Trento (IT). 
Third, some Italian regions were merged before sampling: Piemonte and Valle d’Aoste, Abruzzo and 
Molise, and Puglia and Basilicata. These regions were disaggregated for the descriptive analysis 
alone.  
Fourth, with the adoption of the NUTS 2016 classification, some regional designations and territorial 
units changed. First, the Hungarian region Közép-Magyarország (HU10) was split in two a regional 
and a capital region (Budapest (HU11) and Buda (HU10)). Both new regions were assigned their 
original NUTS 2013 scores (HU10). Second, in Poland the region designation of five regions changed 
(PL11=PL71, PL33=PL72 & PL82, PL31 = PL81, and PL34 = PL84) and a new capital region was created 
(PL12=PL91 & PL92). Third, the NUTS 2010 classification was recoded into the NUTS 2016 
classification. Fourth, though Lithuania was split in two NUTS 2 regions, we kept the original one 
NUTS 2 designation. And finally, all France’s regions changed name, though no substantive changes 
were made.  
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Appendix 2 
The quality of public services 
- How would you rate the quality of public education in your area (‘1’ extremely poor quality – ‘10’ extremely 
high quality) 
- How would you rate the quality of the public health care system in your area (‘1’ extremely poor quality – ‘10’ 
extremely high quality) 
- How would you rate the quality of the police force in your area (‘1’ extremely poor quality – ‘10’ extremely 
high quality) 
The impartiality of public services  
- Certain people are given special advantages in the public education system in my area (‘1’ strongly disagree – 
’10; strongly agree) 
- Certain people are given special advantages in the public health care system in my area (‘1’ strongly disagree – 
’10; strongly agree) 
- The police force gives special advantages to certain people in my area (‘1’ strongly disagree – ’10; strongly 
agree) 
- All citizens are treated equally in the public education system in my area (‘1’ Agree, ‘2’ Rather agree, ‘3’ 
Rather disagree’, ‘4’ Disagree) 
- All citizens are treated equally in the public health system in my area (‘1’ Agree, ‘2’ Rather agree, ‘3’ Rather 
disagree’, ‘4’ Disagree) 
- All citizens are treated equally by the police force in my area (‘1’ Agree, ‘2’ Rather agree, ‘3’ Rather disagree’, 
‘4’ Disagree) 
- The tax authorities in my area treat all people equally (‘1’ strongly disagree – ’10; strongly agree) 
The level of corruption in public services  
- Corruption is prevalent in my area’s local public school system (‘1’ strongly disagree – ’10; strongly agree) 
- Corruption is prevalent in the public health system in my area (‘1’ strongly disagree – ’10; strongly agree) 
- Corruption is prevalent in the police force in my area (‘1’ strongly disagree – ’10; strongly agree) 
- People in my area must use some form of corruption to just get some basic public services (‘1’ strongly 
disagree – ’10; strongly agree) 
- Corruption in my area is used to get access to special unfair privileges and wealth (‘1’ strongly disagree – ’10; 
strongly agree) 
- In the last 12 months, have you or anyone in your family been asked by a public official to give an informal gift 
or bribe in: (a): Education services? (b): Health or medical services? (c): Police? d) aby other public service (Yes 
= ‘1’, No = ‘0’)  
- In the past 12 months have you or anyone living in your household paid a bribe in any form to: (a): Education 
services? (b): Health or medical services? (c): Police? d) aby other public service (Yes = ‘1’, No = ‘0’) 
- Elections in my area are clean from corruption (‘1’ strongly disagree – ’10; strongly agree) 
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Appendix 3 
 
 
 Deviance Δ dev to 
model 5 
Δ df. to 
Model 5 
Critical value 
ꭓ2 at p.005 
Model 5 131,302.6    
Model 2 131,388.4 35.8 2 10.8276 
Model 3 131,356.8 54.2 2 10.8276 
Model 4 131,315.4 12.8 2 10.8276 
View publication stats
